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CYBER BABEL: FINDING THE LINGUA FRANCA
IN CYBERSECURITY REGULATION
William Pierotti*
Cybersecurity regulations have proliferated over the past few years as the
significance of the threat has drawn more attention. With breaches making
headlines, the public and their representatives are imposing requirements on
those that hold sensitive data with renewed vigor. As high-value targets that
hold large amounts of sensitive data, financial institutions are among the
most heavily regulated. Regulations are necessary. However, regulations
also come with costs that impact both large and small companies, their
customers, and local, national, and international economies. As the
regulations have proliferated so have those costs. The regulations will
inevitably and justifiably diverge where different governments view the needs
of their citizens differently. However, that should not prevent regulators
from recognizing areas of agreement.
This Note examines the regulatory regimes governing the data and
cybersecurity practices of financial institutions implemented by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Department of
Financial Services, and the General Data Protection Regulations of the
European Union to identify areas where requirements overlap, with the goal
of suggesting implementations that promote consistency, clarity, and cost
reduction.
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INTRODUCTION
My name is Legion: for we are many.
—Mark 5:91

After Yahoo! disclosed two cyberbreaches, Verizon lowered its offer to
purchase Yahoo! by $350 million—from $4.83 billion to $4.48 billion.2 This
represented a 7 percent decrease in value. With over one billion
compromised accounts, the Yahoo! breach was massive.3 It is significant,
however, that the compromised information took the form of email
addresses, names, telephone numbers, and dates of birth.4 The Equifax
breach affected roughly 143 million Americans, and the data exposed
arguably included more sensitive information, such as Social Security and
credit card numbers.5 While the ultimate outcome of the Equifax breach
remains uncertain and the company has regained some of its lost value,6 the

1. Mark 5:9 (King James).
2. Ingrid Lunden, After Data Breaches, Verizon Knocks $350M Off Yahoo Sale, Now
Valued at $4.48B, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 21, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/21/verizonknocks-350m-off-yahoo-sale-after-data-breaches-now-valued-at-4-48b/
[https://perma.cc/
5YVL-MF3F].
3. Id.
4. Kate Conger, Yahoo Discloses Hack of 1 Billion Accounts, TECHCRUNCH (Dec.
14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/14/yahoo-discloses-hack-of-1-billion-accounts/
[https://perma.cc/AZ75-ESB7].
5. Michelle Fox, Equifax Will Not Survive Fallout from Massive Breach, Says
Technology Attorney, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/14/
equifax-will-not-survive-fallout-from-massive-breach-says-technology-attorney.html
[https://perma.cc/YVE5-CLGV].
6. Wayne Duggan, Equifax Stock May Be OK, After All, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017,
7:17 AM),
https://money.usnews.com/investing/stock-market-news/articles/2017-11-10/
equifax-inc-efx-stock-earnings-data-breach [https://perma.cc/EYR5-47YX].
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initial market loss was $4 billion.7 That represents a 20 percent decrease in
market value.8 The actual costs of the breach, even if the stock regains value
and after insurance coverage kicks in, have been estimated at $200 to $300
million.9
Breaches10 represent a significant threat to businesses and consumers.11
Businesses that hold sensitive information about their consumers, such as
financial institutions, make tempting targets for cybercriminals.12 The cost
of a breach, per record lost or stolen, at a financial institution is also higher
than in most other industries.13 Because these institutions need to remain
connected to the internet, it is likely impossible for them to fully prevent
intrusions.14 Given this reality, the focus has been on what should be
required of these institutions to limit the risk, mitigate the damage, and notify
their consumers.15
As a result of the importance of the issue and the multijurisdictional
significance of these institutions, a number of government organizations and
agencies have addressed these questions.16 While goals are similar,

7. Paul J. Lim, Equifax’s Massive Data Breach Has Cost the Company $4 Billion So
Far, TIME (Sept. 12, 2017), http://time.com/money/4936732/equifaxs-massive-data-breachhas-cost-the-company-4-billion-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/M97T-5WTN].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 7 (June
2017),
https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SEL03130WWEN
[https://perma.cc/BM6D-RWXQ] (defining a breach “as an event in which an individual’s
name and a medical record and/or a financial record or debit card is potentially put at risk—
either in electronic or paper format”).
11. See Stacy Cowley, FBI Director: Cybercrime Will Eclipse Terrorism, CNN (Mar. 2,
2012,
7:55
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/
[https://perma.cc/YS59-AFK4]; Stephanie Palmer-Derrien, “No Greater Threat” Than
Cyber,
Says
SIFMA,
ASSETSERVICINGTIMES
(Nov.
2,
2017),
http://www.assetservicingtimes.com/assetservicesnews/article.php?article_id=7741
[https://perma.cc/RFK5-J5QC] (“Testifying before the US House of Representatives
committee on financial services subcommittee hearing on data security, [president and CEO
of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Kenneth] Bentsen said: ‘There
is likely no greater threat to financial stability than a large-scale cyber event.’”).
12. Palmer-Derrien, supra note 11; Larry Zelvin, Director, Nat’l Cybersecurity &
Commc’ns Integration Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission Cybersecurity Roundtable 28 (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable/cybersecurity-roundtable-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/
A6JL-Y46R].
13. PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 5 (“Certain industries have more costly data
breaches. The average global cost of data breach per lost or stolen record was $141. However,
health care organizations had an average cost of $380 and in financial services the average
cost was $245.”).
14. See generally Cowley, supra note 11 (“There are only two types of companies: those
that have been hacked, and those that will be. Even that is merging into one category: those
that have been hacked and will be again . . . .”).
15. Bhashit (Sheek) Shah, SEC Increases Focus on Cyber Incident Response, REED SMITH
LLP (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2017/08/privacy-dataprotection/sec-increases-focus-on-cyber-incident-response/ [http://perma.cc/7Y3Z-PMUB].
16. Id.
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implementations have varied.17 These variations could unintentionally divert
resources from expenditures on security towards understanding and
administering compliance programs.18 Industry representatives emphasize
the importance of cybersecurity in the financial sector.19 However, they also
present a troubling figure, with firms “report[ing] that approximately 40
percent of corporate cybersecurity activities are compliance-oriented rather
than security-oriented.”20 Regulatory bodies could mitigate this issue by
acknowledging areas of overlap and working together to define common
standards.21 Currently, each covered entity must perform this analysis
independently at substantial cost, regardless of size or availability of
resources, with limited exceptions.22 Regulatory bodies should diminish
areas of uncertainty and facilitate more efficient allocations of resources by
identifying and aligning similar requirements.
This is particularly important with regard to financial institutions, as they
are part of the critical infrastructure of the United States23 and the European
Union (EU).24 In the United States, critical infrastructure has been defined
as systems that are so vital to the United States that their “incapacity or
destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact on security, national

17. See generally Allison Grande, Cybersecurity Policy to Watch for the Rest of 2017,
LAW360 (July 12, 2017, 7:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/937323/cybersecuritypolicy-to-watch-for-the-rest-of-2017 [https://perma.cc/8PJ2-PZWJ].
18. Palmer-Derrien, supra note 11; see also Michael Krimminger et al., New York
Cybersecurity Regulations for Financial Institutions Enter into Effect, CLEARY GOTTLIEB
STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organizearchive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/alert-memos/alert-memo-201729.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQ8W-5S4L].
19. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al., Comment Letter on New
York Department of Financial Services’ Proposed Rulemaking on Cybersecurity
Requirements for Financial Services Companies 2 (Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter SIFMA
Comment Letter], https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/SIFMA-NYDFS-Proposed-Cyber-Requirements.pdf [http://perma.cc/4YXA-97KF] (stating that
“[c]ybersecurity remains a top priority for the financial industry,” with “investments that can
run as high as $500 million per year for the largest firms”); see also Bhargav Mitra & Robert
McCausland, How Identity Data Is Turning Toxic for Big Companies, CONVERSATION (Dec.
4, 2017, 4:05 AM), https://theconversation.com/how-identity-data-is-turning-toxic-for-bigcompanies-88436 [http://perma.cc/JAY5-E5WP] (“One report has found that banks spent
nearly US$100 billion on compliance in 2016 and the global spending on meeting the
regulatory requirements increased from 15% to 25% over the previous four years. This
skyrocketing spend on compliance leaves little room for product development.”).
20. SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 2.
21. See generally PRIVACY BRIDGES: EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS IN SEARCH OF
TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS (2015) [hereinafter PRIVACY BRIDGES],
https://privacybridges.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/PrivacyBridges-FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/46CS-MY33].
22. See Mitra & McCausland, supra note 19 (“[P]urchasing the technology to adhere to
the GDPR standards . . . will cost Fortune 500 companies on average US$1m each. Add to
this the costs of permanent staffing and legal advice for this compliance, you get the picture
of overall spending required for one set of regulatory standards.”).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c (2012).
24. European Commission Memorandum MEMO/06/477, European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection (Dec. 12, 2006).
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economic security, national public health or safety.”25 Similarly, the EU has
defined them as systems that are “essential for the maintenance of vital
societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of
people” such that there would be a significant impact if they were destroyed
or degraded.26 Given the significance of the financial sector, it is crucial to
regulate in a way that furthers the enunciated security goals as effectively as
possible. Compliance with cybersecurity regulations should promote better
cybersecurity, not unnecessary expenditures on understanding byzantine
regulatory regimes. Clarifying where the myriad and opaque obligations
created by various regulatory schemes overlap and can be satisfied through a
single action or process would help accomplish this extremely important goal
and would also ensure that resources are actually used to improve
cybersecurity. The regulatory bodies that propagated those regulations are
best situated to do so.
This Note examines three bodies charged with regulating in this area: the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), New York Department of
Financial Services (NYDFS), and EU. Part I provides an overview of the
current regulatory landscape. Part II identifies similar or associated
requirements that provide an opportunity for standardization or clarification.
Part III explores the benefits of coordination, recommends mechanisms the
regulatory bodies could use to coordinate, and applies them to the areas
identified in Part II.
I. THE CURRENT CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Part I of this Note provides a baseline explanation of which entities are
affected by each regulatory regime, how the regulations developed, what
compliance with the regulations entails, and a discussion of what some of the
potential ramifications of the regulations are. Part I.A discusses the
regulations, guidance, and other materials that have been disseminated by
three regulatory bodies, the SEC, NYDFS, and EU, to determine what
measures they expect covered entities to take. Part I.B explores the costs of
compliance, providing insights into the effects these regulations have and
current trends in the financial industry that may be influenced by these
regulations.
A. Where We Are in Cyberregulation and How We Got Here
Part I.A provides an outline of the three regulatory regimes, particularly
regarding their jurisdiction, evolution, and a broad explanation of their
requirements. Part I.A begins with the SEC requirements, proceeds to the
NYDFS regulations, and concludes with the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).

25. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
26. Council Directive 2008/114, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 345) 75, 77 (EC).
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1. Putting the SEC in Security
On November 13, 2000, the SEC’s “safeguards rule,” which established
appropriate standards for the protection of customer information at financial
institutions, came into effect.27 Since the SEC has jurisdiction over
investment advisers,28 brokers,29 dealers,30 and investment companies,31 all
entities that are characterized as such are subject to the safeguards rule.32
Further, any financial institutions that engage in these activities, such as some
banks, must evaluate whether they are subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction and,
if so, must comply with this regulation.33
In 2005 the safeguards rule was updated to require covered entities to
create and implement “written policies and procedures” that contemplate
“administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” for the purposes of
protecting customer information.34 These policies must be “reasonably
designed” to accomplish three goals with regard to customer data:
(1) provide for the data’s security and confidentiality; (2) protect the data
from anticipated threats; and (3) prevent unauthorized access to or use of the
data that could cause substantial harm or inconvenience.35
For a decade after promulgating these regulations, the SEC only brought
three enforcement actions based on the cybersecurity measures implemented
by covered entities. The first enforcement action was brought against the
LPL Financial Corporation after it suffered a breach that resulted in thirdparty trading and attempts to trade on several customer accounts.36 In this
action, the SEC established that written policies must be sufficient.37 The
SEC stated that LPL’s written policies were limited, insufficient, and failed
to address the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards discussed
above.38 The SEC also noted that LPL disregarded the regulatory
27. 17 C.F.R. § 248.18(a) (2018).
28. STAFF OF THE INV. ADVISER REGULATION OFFICE DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/
rplaze-042012.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2BG-GATQ] (defining investment advisers to include
“[m]oney managers, investment consultants, and financial planners”).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012) (defining brokers to include individuals who
professionally effect securities transactions on behalf of others).
30. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (defining dealers to include individuals who professionally buy or
sell securities on their own behalf).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2012) (defining an investment company as an issuer that
“is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities”).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 248.1(b).
33. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html
[http://perma.cc/CDK2-28AA] (last modified Dec. 12, 2016) (“[B]anks that buy and sell
securities must consider whether they are ‘dealers’ under the federal securities laws.”).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a).
35. Id.
36. LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58,515, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2775, at 3 (Sept. 11, 2008).
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
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requirements by failing to take action when alerted to possible security
issues.39
The SEC’s second enforcement action was brought against
Commonwealth Equity Services after intruders accessed its intranet and
acquired a list of its customers’ accounts.40 The intruders subsequently used
eight compromised customer accounts to place orders before the activity was
The SEC found Commonwealth’s security procedures
detected.41
inadequate, despite the company’s written policies that addressed
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.42 The SEC noted the
failure to employ basic safeguards, such as installing antivirus software on
all computers connected to the internet.43 The SEC also emphasized the
failure to address, or have a procedure to handle, security issues that were
discovered through either audits or reports to the IT help desk.44 These
weaknesses demonstrated that the policy was not reasonably designed as
required.45
The third enforcement action was brought against GunnAllen Financial
after three laptop computers and an employee’s computer credentials were
stolen, which put customer information at risk.46 The SEC found that the
company’s written policy was insufficient because it failed to define specific
procedures and safeguards that would be implemented.47 The SEC also
noted the absence of staff guidance explaining their role in protecting
customer information and complying with the safeguards rule.48 Similar to
the action against Commonwealth, the SEC noted the absence of procedures
for rectifying potential security issues and for responding to a breach.49
Despite a relatively slow start, “[r]ecent enforcement actions targeting
violations of the safeguards rule show that the SEC is serious about
cybersecurity compliance.”50 Since 2015, the SEC has settled enforcement
actions against three entities for failing to comply with the safeguards rule

39. Id. at 5.
40. Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60,733, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2929, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2009).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 4–5.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220, at 2 (Apr. 7, 2011).
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Rajesh De et al., New Heads of Enforcement at the US Securities and Exchange
Commission Continue Agency’s Focus on Cybersecurity, MAYER BROWN (July 12, 2017),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/New-Heads-of-Enforcement-at-the-US-Securities-andExchange-Commission-Continue-Agencys-Focus-on-Cybersecurity-07-12-2017/
[http://perma.cc/B6F8-6PQ4] (“The new enforcement co-directors’ very clear initial
statements on cybersecurity mean that firms should expect cybersecurity enforcement and
examination activity to continue under the new administration.”).
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requirements.51 Through these actions, a clearer picture of what the SEC
safeguards rule requires is emerging.52
On September 22, 2015, the SEC brought and settled an action against R.T.
Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc. after its web server was
compromised, resulting in unauthorized access to the data therein.53 The
SEC asserted that R.T. Jones failed to comply with the written policy
requirement because it did not address the security and confidentiality of its
clients’ personally identifiable information (PII) on the server or adequately
address the protection of PII from “anticipated threats or unauthorized
access.”54 The SEC noted that R.T. Jones did not schedule or conduct risk
assessments regularly, or have a plan in place to respond to cybersecurity
incidents.55 The SEC also noted the absence of technical safeguards, such as
a firewall or the use of encryption on the server containing PII.56 This action
marked a change from previous enforcement actions, as it “underscore[d]
that investment advisers and broker-dealers may face regulatory scrutiny and
enforcement actions even without a concrete, identifiable financial impact to
clients.”57
The SEC found it significant that R.T. Jones promptly undertook remedial
efforts and cited those efforts in its decision.58 The first set of remedial
measures included oversight changes, such as drafting and implementing an
information-security policy.59 The second set involved technical changes,
including ceasing to store PII on its webservers, encrypting PII stored on its
51. See generally Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415 (June 8, 2016); Craig Scott Capital, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 77,595 (Apr. 12, 2016); R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204 (Sept. 22, 2015).
52. Carmen Germaine, SEC Poised to Turn Cybersecurity Focus into Enforcement,
LAW360 (July 7, 2017, 12:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/937197/sec-poised-toturn-cybersecurity-focus-into-enforcement [https://perma.cc/TE7E-MMUG]. See generally
Julie Kadish, SEC’s Focus on Enforcing Data Security Safeguards Continues: Lessons
Learned from Its $1M Fine of Morgan Stanley, DYKEMA (June 15, 2016),
https://www.dykema.com/resources-alerts-sec-focus-on-enforcing-data-security-safeguardscontinues-lessons-learned-from-its-1m-fine-of-morgan-stanley_06-15-2016.html
[https://perma.cc/6ARA-8LBA].
53. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204,
at 2–3 (Sept. 22, 2015).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Timothy C. Blank et al., SEC Cybersecurity Examinations and Enforcement: What
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Need to Know, DECHERT LLP (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/729014f4-bfef-4c3c-96a54e4d64c01f22.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF5X-YN54]; see also Jenna N. Felz, Data Security in
the Financial Industry: Five Key Developments to Keep an Eye on in 2016, DATA PRIVACY
MONITOR (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/financial-privacy/datasecurity-in-the-financial-industry-five-key-developments-to-keep-an-eye-on-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/34JZ-429Y] (“Notably, there was no evidence of any harm to clients as a
result of the hack.”).
58. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204,
at 4 (Sept. 22, 2015).
59. Id.
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internal networks, and installing tools to detect and respond to malicious
activity.60 The final change was the retention of a cybersecurity firm to
provide reports and advice regarding the firm’s security posture.61
The SEC elaborated on its requirements for an adequate safeguard policy
in its action against Craig Scott Capital (CSC).62 The action was not related
to a breach but arose purely because CSC did not abide by the safeguards
rule.63 In this action, the SEC found CSC’s written policy inadequate
because it did not address how customer information would be handled
internally.64 The policy was also found inadequate because it was incomplete
and insufficiently “tailored to the actual practices at CSC.”65
In addition to the inadequacy of the written policies and procedures, the
SEC noted that CSC did not even follow the written policy. The SEC also
observed that CSC failed to encrypt customer information that was
transmitted remotely despite including these measures in their written
policy.66
In a subsequent action, the SEC addressed internal safeguards focused on
employee access to confidential information. This action arose after a
Morgan Stanley employee misappropriated customer data from
approximately 730,000 accounts.67 The confidential data was stored on the
employee’s personal server, which was likely hacked by a third party.68
Some of the stolen data was then posted on a number of internet sites, with
an offer of more stolen data for interested purchasers.69
The SEC stated that, despite having written policies and procedures,
Morgan Stanley had breached the safeguards rule.70 The safeguards were
not reasonably designed to protect customers’ PII because they did not
“adequately address certain key administrative, technical and physical
safeguards.”71 It found that Morgan Stanley failed to adequately restrict
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3–4.
62. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 5 (Apr. 12, 2016).
63. Id.; Kadish, supra note 52 (“This settlement serves as a reminder that both firms and
individuals can be fined and held accountable even if no customer is financially harmed.”).
64. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 5 (Apr. 12, 2016).
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016); Press Release No. 15-334, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, S.D.N.Y., Former Morgan Stanley Financial Adviser Sentenced in Manhattan Federal
Court for Illegally Accessing Confidential Client Information (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-morgan-stanley-financial-adviser-sentencedmanhattan-federal-court-illegally-0 [https://perma.cc/LA3X-7RMR] (“MARSH illegally
accessed the Bank’s confidential client information in order to use it for his personal advantage
as a private wealth management adviser at the Bank. From October 2013 through December
2014, MARSH was engaged in discussions regarding potential employment with two other
financial institutions that are competitors of the Bank.”).
68. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5–6.
71. Id. at 6.
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employee access to the data necessary to accomplish a legitimate business
need.72 Further, the SEC noted that Morgan Stanley did not monitor or
analyze how employees were accessing data or using their system accesses.73
For these reasons, the SEC found Morgan Stanley’s policies to be
inadequate.74
In addition to enforcement actions, the SEC releases guidance containing
assessments and advice regarding cybersecurity that may indicate its
expectations.75
In preparing these assessments, the SEC performs
examinations of covered entities and evaluates their policies, including
assessing whether the policies were actually implemented.76 They also
evaluate how covered entities address areas including: “(1) governance and
risk assessment; (2) access rights and controls; (3) data loss prevention;
(4) vendor management; (5) training; and (6) incident response.”77 In
performing the most recent assessment, the SEC found that while there were
improvements in cybersecurity and safeguards from previous evaluations,
the majority of policies and procedures still suffered from deficiencies.78
One issue that the SEC highlighted was the failure to reasonably tailor
policies, such as through a lack of specificity.79 The SEC also noted that
some firms did not enforce their policies or had written policies that did not
accurately reflect the actual practices that were employed.80 The SEC went
on to express concern that entities failed to perform ongoing system
maintenance and omitted simple practices such as installing software patches
addressing known vulnerabilities.81 These concerns reflect several elements
discussed above in the enforcement actions, including the failure to create a
detailed, tailored plan and to implement technical operational safeguards.
The examples of robust security practices may constitute the most
significant guidance. One recommendation was to perform “a complete
inventory of data and information, along with classifications of the risks,
vulnerabilities, data, [and] business consequences.”82 Complementing this
recommendation, the SEC suggested that requests for access to data by
employees should be tracked and that policies and procedures should address
the modification of employee access rights when their need to access data
changed.83

72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 6.
75. See generally Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, RISK ALERT (U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurityexaminations.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7LG-6VRK].
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4–5.
83. Id. at 5.
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Another significant recommendation was to establish a plan of action that
outlined what to do and who to contact in the event of a breach.84 Beyond
this, the SEC recommended that senior management be involved in vetting
and approving the policies and procedures.85
The SEC also recommended utilizing vulnerability scans to identify
weaknesses and adequately remediating any identified issues.86 This
recommendation reflects some of the enforcement actions the SEC took with
regard to known issues that the covered entities failed to address. The SEC
found it problematic that high-risk vulnerabilities discovered during such
testing were not properly addressed.87
The SEC recommended that covered entities provide guidance to
employees explaining how the networks and equipment should be
appropriately accessed and used.88 It suggested that entities consider
including mandatory information-security training in their policy, as well as
implementing procedures to ensure that such training was completed.89 The
SEC also expressed concern that some entities did not enforce mandatory
training despite including it in their policies.90
2. They Want to Be a Part of It: New York, New York
Department of Financial Services
In 2017, the NYDFS promulgated regulations regarding cybersecurity at
financial services companies.91 These regulations apply to entities that
operate under a “certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization
under the Banking Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law.”92
This has the potential to “encompass an extremely broad range of businesses
given the vast scope of New York banking, insurance, and financial services
laws.”93 Entities that are likely to be covered include, “commercial banks,
foreign banks with New York State-licensed offices, mortgage brokers and
servicers, small-loan lenders and money transmitters doing business in New
York.”94 In addition, these entities are responsible for the actions of third
parties they share data with.95

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 4.
91. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017).
92. Id. § 500.01.
93. Krimminger et al., supra note 18, at 2.
94. Adam J. Fleisher & Nathan D. Taylor, New York Cybersecurity Regulations: What
Do They Mean and When Do They Mean It By?, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, at 1–2 (Mar.
23, 2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/170323-ny-cybersecurity-regulations.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7LHA-MFL6].
95. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.
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In contrast to the jurisdiction of the SEC, the NYDFS does not directly
license or regulate investment advisors, brokers, or dealers in New York.96
However, the entities that are regulated by the NYDFS are often affiliated
with investment advisers, brokers, and dealers. Because of this, they usually
share computer and communications infrastructure with entities regulated by
the SEC, meaning that these entities are often subject to both regulations.97
This is because it would be inefficient for many of those entities to deploy
separate networks for different branches of business.98 These factors are
significant in evaluating the NYDFS regulations since they possibly reach
beyond the entities they directly address.99 For the purposes of this Note, it
is enough to recognize that the NYDFS regulations will likely apply to some
entities covered by the SEC regulations.
The NYDFS promulgated these regulations because they believed there
was a need for minimum standards due to the serious nature of the risk.100
The regulations require covered entities to assess the specific risks they face
and adopt a program designed to protect themselves and their customers.101
The NYDFS requires that entities “implement and maintain a written
policy or policies . . . setting forth [their] policies and procedures” to protect
their information systems.102 These policies must address concerns such as
customer data privacy, incident response, and systems and network
security.103 The NYDFS regulations define functions that should be
addressed, such as detecting cybersecurity events, responding to and
mitigating events that occur, recovering from the event and restoring normal
operations and services, and fulfilling reporting requirements.104 The
NYDFS regulations identify fourteen specific areas that should be addressed
when applicable, including data governance and classification, asset

96. Marcus A. Asner et al., New York Department of Financial Services Issues Final
Cybersecurity Regulations, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/02/new-york-departmentof-financial-services [https://perma.cc/KRT8-Q242].
97. Id. (“[T]he use of common computer and communications platforms among affiliated
financial services firms may as a practical matter regulate the operations of broker-dealer and
investment adviser firms that are affiliated with Covered Entities.”).
98. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Cyber Winter Is Here, and Coming to
Regulation: New York Cybersecurity Rule Ice Dragon Heading for the Wall, JD SUPRA (Oct.
4, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-cybersecurity-rule-ice-dragon40435/ [https://perma.cc/LY8V-E4UY] (“Many large institutions gain efficiencies by
deploying centrally managed information technology platforms and cybersecurity programs
and tools. Thus, if only a part of an organization falls under the Cybersecurity Rules, it would
be impractical for the larger enterprise not to adhere to the Cybersecurity Rules.”).
99. Steven R. Chabinsky et al., Cybersecurity: Regulators Show Their Teeth, WHITE &
CASE LLP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/
publications/cybersecurity-regulators-show-teeth-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/35N2-W5NC].
100. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 500.03.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 500.02.
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inventory, access controls, and systems and network security and
monitoring.105
Covered entities also must have incident response plans that address
internal processes; goals; clearly defined “roles, responsibilities and levels of
decision-making authority”; information sharing; methods of vulnerability
identification and remediation; methods of documentation and reporting; and
the evaluation and revision of such plans following a cybersecurity event.106
The NYDFS regulations also require that the compliance plan implement
methods of testing and monitoring, which permits entities to choose between
continuous monitoring or periodic penetration testing and vulnerability
assessments.107 The NYDFS does not mandate any specific method for
continuous monitoring.108 However, the monitoring should be designed to
identify changes that potentially create vulnerabilities and activities that may
be malicious.109 The NYDFS explicitly provides that “periodic manual
review of logs and firewall configurations” are not sufficient steps to satisfy
the continuous monitoring obligation.110
With regard to personnel with access to systems, the NYDFS requires that
covered entities implement access controls and periodically review what
privileges employees require.111 Entities must also implement systems to
monitor user activity and detect unauthorized activity by those users.112
They also require the entity to regularly provide current cybersecurity
training.113
The NYDFS regulations require some specific measures that act as
effective controls on data flows, such as multifactor authentication when the
entity allows the internal network to be accessed externally through remote
access or other means.114 A second specified measure is implementing
encryption to protect customer data both while traversing external networks
and while at rest internally.115

105. Id. § 500.03 (listing “(a) information security; (b) data governance and classification;
(c) asset inventory and device management; (d) access controls and identity management;
(e) business continuity and disaster recovery planning and resources; (f) systems operations
and availability concerns; (g) systems and network security; (h) systems and network
monitoring; (i) systems and application development and quality assurance; (j) physical
security and environmental controls; (k) customer data privacy; (l) vendor and Third Party
Service Provider management; (m) risk assessment; and (n) incident response”).
106. Id. § 500.16.
107. Id. § 500.05.
108. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding 23 NYCRR Part 500, N.Y. DEP’T FIN.
SERVICES, http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/cybersecurity_faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/48YPA7H2] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.07.
112. Id. § 500.14.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 500.12.
115. Id. § 500.15(a).
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3. The Final Countdown to the GDPR
On April 27, 2016, the EU adopted the GDPR.116 The Regulation became
effective on May 25, 2018.117 The jurisdiction provided under the GDPR
reaches further than either the SEC or NYDFS regulations. The GDPR
applies
to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by
a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing
activities are related to . . . the offering of goods or services, irrespective of
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in
the Union; or . . . the monitoring of their [behavior] as far as their
[behavior] takes place within the Union.118

This broad territorial scope means that the physical location of the entity will
be less significant, with the focus instead being on where the data came
from.119 Practically, this may mean that companies marketing goods or
services in the EU will be subject to the GDPR.120 This would include any
financial institution marketing services to EU clients.
The Regulation states that to protect customer data, “measures should
ensure an appropriate level of security, including confidentiality, taking into
account the state of the art and the costs of implementation in relation to the
risks and the nature of the personal data to be protected.”121 The GDPR also
requires a written policy or procedure in the form of a data protection impact
assessment (DPIA) whenever activities involve a high risk to the rights and
freedoms of EU persons.122 While the analysis necessary to evaluate high
risk is not wholly settled, the EU Working Party 29 (WP29)123 suggests a list
of ten factors and recommends that if two are met a DPIA should be

116. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 88 (EU).
117. Id. art. 99.
118. Id. art. 3.
119. Jonathan Millard & Tyler Newby, EU’s General Data Protection Regulation:
Sweeping Changes Coming to European and U.S. Companies, A.B.A. (May 23, 2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/technology/articles/spring2016-0516-eugeneral-data-protection-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/K3UH-8Y78]
(“Jurisdiction
will . . . be measured digitally rather than physically, paying less attention to the physical
location of the entity undertaking the processing.”).
120. Courtney M. Bowman, A Primer on the GDPR: What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/12/articles/european-union/a-primeron-the-gdpr-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/7JMX-W2RP].
121. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, recital 83.
122. Id.
123. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Privacy & Cybersecurity Update—
October 2017, JD SUPRA (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/privacycybersecurity-update-october-54232/ [https://perma.cc/P7SR-AY7K] (“WP29 is an EU
advisory body made up of representatives from the data protection authorities of EU members.
It is charged with providing expert guidance on data protection issues and promoting uniform
application of data protection laws across the EU. Though not technically binding on EU
member states’ individual data protection commissioners, WP29’s guidance carries a good
deal of weight when the individual commissioners evaluate data privacy issues.”).
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performed.124 Two factors the WP29 identifies that almost certainly apply
to U.S. financial institutions are sensitive data, such as financial data, and
data that will be transferred outside of the EU.125 Of the remaining factors,
several seem likely to apply to financial institutions as well.126 While
financial institutions will always need to perform a fact-specific analysis to
evaluate whether a DPIA is necessary, the WP29 guidance suggests that it
will nearly always be necessary in this context.127
While a DPIA evaluates more than security, one of only four requirements
of such an assessment is to identify the measures an entity intends to take to
mitigate the risks to personal data,128 which indicates the significance of this
element.129 The measures adopted should be based on factors such as costs,
state of the art, risk, and severity of the rights at issue, and they also must
address issues such as data flow, unauthorized access, and destruction or
degradation of data, among a number of other concerns.130
The GDPR also suggests the use of some specific measures such as
encryption, de-identification, security-measure testing, and the remediation
of any vulnerabilities uncovered as a result of such testing.131 It specifically
suggests that pseudonymization and encryption might be appropriate
measures to adopt.132 The GDPR also recommends establishing means to
regularly test and evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted measures.133
A covered entity may be able to avoid the notification requirements in the
GDPR if the breach “is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms
of natural persons.”134 For example, if a covered entity utilizes encryption
to make the information unintelligible, they may not have to report the
breach.135 It is important to recognize that this requires reevaluations and
can change with time, as vulnerabilities can be discovered and encryption

124. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk”
for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 7–9, WP 248 (Apr. 4, 2017).
125. Id. at 8–9.
126. See id. at 7–10.
127. See id. at 9–10.
128. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 35.
129. Id.
130. Id. art. 32.
131. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks, Two-Way Street: U.S.-EU
Parallels Under the General Data Protection Regulation Ghostery/Hogan Lovells Data Privacy
Day (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/910663/
160121hoganghostery_dpd.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GAS-2PEU].
132. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 32.
133. Id.
134. Id. art. 33.
135. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Personal Data Breach
Notification Under Regulation 2016/679, at 9, WP 250 (Oct. 3, 2017).
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keys can be compromised.136 In evaluating that risk, the covered entity
should objectively consider “both the likelihood and severity of the risk.”137
The WP29 interprets elements of the GDPR to create an obligation to
“have internal processes in place to be able to detect and address a breach.”138
This could include technical measures that allow the entity “to define events
and alerts.”139 The WP29 recommends that the measures adopted be
included in the entities’ incident response plan.140
B. The Costs of Regulation
Regulations inevitably create costs, which have real effects on economies,
consumers, and institutions.141 The total estimated cost of regulatory
compliance in the United States in 2008 was $1.75 trillion.142 There are
substantial benefits to regulation that can offset these costs, and regulation is
a necessary element in a functioning country and society.143 However,
regulation clearly creates substantial burdens as well.144 These burdens are
shared between public and private institutions, and between businesses and
their customers.145 When compliance costs go up, some portion is pushed
onto consumers or employees.146

136. Id. at 16 (“A breach that would not require notification to the supervisory authority
would be the loss of a securely encrypted mobile device, utilised by the [covered entity] and
its staff. Provided the encryption key remains within the secure possession of the [covered
entity] and this is not the sole copy of the personal data then the personal data would be
inaccessible to an attacker. This means the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights
and freedoms of the data subjects in question. If it later becomes evident that the encryption
key was compromised or that the encryption software or algorithm is vulnerable, then the risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons will change and thus notification may now be
required.”).
137. Id. at 20. Factors to consider include: (1) “the type of breach”; (2) “the nature,
sensitivity, and volume of personal data”; (3) “ease of identification of individuals”;
(4) “severity of consequences for individuals”; (5) “special characteristics of the individual”;
(6) “the number of affected individuals”; and (7) “special characteristics of the data
controller.” Id. at 20–22.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See JOHN BACE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 4–5 (2006),
http://logic.stanford.edu/POEM/externalpapers/understanding_the_costs_of_c_138098.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47UX-QRCH]; Kevin Dobbs, Since Dodd-Frank, Compliance Costs Up at
Least 20% for Many U.S. Banks, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 19, 2017, 9:53 AM),
https://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/our-thinking/ideas/since-dodd-frank-compliancecosts-up-at-least-20-for-many-u-s-banks; William Dunkelberg, The Insidious Cost of
Regulation, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
williamdunkelberg/2017/04/04/the-insidious-cost-of-regulation/#68798dc35c7b
[https://perma.cc/WC2K-Z87T].
142. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL
FIRMS 6 (2010), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory
%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full)_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/654C-39T3].
143. Id. at 10–11.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. See Dobbs, supra note 141. See generally CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 142.
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Another result of rising compliance costs is consolidation. Some predict
that compliance will drive small institutions out of the marketplace.147
Compliance costs more for smaller businesses than it does for larger ones,
with the costs of compliance estimated at $10,585 per employee at a firm
with fewer than twenty employees, compared to $7755 per employee at a
firm with 500 employees or more.148 This means that smaller firms pay
around 36 percent more per employee than larger firms do, largely because
many compliance regimes have fixed costs that are diluted with scale.149
As profit margins decline and compliance costs increase, the number of
small financial institutions has dwindled.150 This could result in less
competition and decreased consumer choice, barriers to new entrants who
could offer improved services, and fewer institutions willing to underwrite
smaller businesses.151
While cybersecurity regulations are necessary, unnecessary costs should
be mitigated. This Note recommends that regulators identify the areas where
a single process or action could satisfy the different regulatory regimes and
provide collaborative guidance in those areas. Part II explores some of these
areas of overlap.
II. IDENTIFYING AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR COORDINATION
These regulations, where they address cybersecurity posture and plans, all
attempt to accommodate changing cybersecurity needs. The three regulatory
schemes presented above are representative of cybersecurity regulations
governing financial institutions but are not exhaustive. Since financial
147. Dobbs, supra note 141 (“[S]ome in the industry expect M&A to continue for years
and eventually result in a banking landscape all but devoid of small institutions.”).
148. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 142, at 8.
149. Id.; Hester Peirce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS (May
15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-numbers-in-the-financial-industry/
[https://perma.cc/7YQ3-5EMP] (“Many regulations disproportionately burden small
[financial institutions] that are not subsidiaries of a larger firm with extensive compliance
resources.”).
150. Peirce, supra note 149 (“The number of [broker-dealers] has declined fairly
consistently over the last decade. In March 2017, there were 3,989 [broker-dealers] registered
with the SEC compared to 5,892 in March 2007, a more than thirty percent drop.”); see also
Nick Fera, How Small Broker-Dealers Can Survive in Today’s Shifting Trading Landscape,
THESTREET (Sept. 10, 2015, 10:25 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13267934/1/areyou-a-small-broker-dealer-here-s-how-you-can-survive.html [http://perma.cc/E7BZ-D68A]
(“The number of broker-dealer firms registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority dropped to 4,040 by April 2015 from 4,578 in 2010, a nearly 12% decrease . . . .
Most analysts and industry experts agree that there are two primary factors fueling this trend:
shrinking margins and swelling compliance costs.”); Bruce Kelly, With Margins Crashing,
Broker-Dealers Look to Merge: Report, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sept. 21, 2017, 2:15 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170921/FREE/170929982/with-marginscrashing-broker-dealers-look-to-merge-report [https://perma.cc/34KR-ZTDT] (“The number
of [Independent Broker-Dealers] has declined 28%, with 904 open for business in 2015,
compared to 1,255 such firms that were up and running in 2005. And with increased regulation
pressuring profits, broker-dealer operating margins dropped from 12% in 2006 to just 3% in
2016.”).
151. Peirce, supra note 149.
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institutions fall under the jurisdiction of each of these bodies, as well as
others, it would be valuable to ascertain where requirements are common and
can be adopted as part of a single compliance plan.
Part II focuses on identifying elements common to all three regulatory
regimes. The purpose is to recognize the areas where the regulatory bodies
are operating in the same or similar spaces. Part II is not intended to be a
comprehensive analysis of every area where harmonization could occur.
Rather, it identifies a few requirements that are costly to implement and
significant within the regulatory regimes to serve as examples. Part II.A
addresses data classification, II.B the formulation of written policies, and II.C
the implementation of encryption.
A. Classing Up the Joint: Data Classification
Data classification “is the process of identifying, understanding and
mapping out the data flows of an organisation.”152 This requires an
exhaustive cataloging of the information held by the entity, with the end
product being a visual representation of data assets and flows.153 This
visualization illustrates the different types of data held by the organization
and the way that data is transferred and disclosed both within the organization
and to third parties.154 Engaging in such a process can provide an entity with
a comprehensive understanding of how their data travels both inside and
outside of their networks.155 Although this area is discussed the most
obliquely by all three regulatory regimes, it is fundamental to a discussion of
compliance under any of them.156 As a practical matter, data classification
is necessary to comply with all three regulatory regimes.157
In its action against Morgan Stanley, the SEC suggests an obligation to
limit employee access based on need.158 This indicates an expectation that
covered entities evaluate employee needs for data and provide the lowest
level of access privilege necessary to satisfy those needs. This is significant
because it requires that an entity classify the data it holds and contemplate
what controls it should exercise over the movement of that data.
The SEC also indicated the necessity of data classification through
guidance and suggested that entities have “a complete inventory of data and
information, along with classifications of the risks, vulnerabilities, data,
[and] business consequences.”159 The SEC also recommends tracking
152. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IN 13 GAME
CHANGERS 33 (2018), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/-/media/files/insight/publications/
2018/05/bk_uk_eugeneraldataprotection_mar2018.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 34 (“Understanding one’s . . . data flows . . . is an essential prerequisite for any
privacy compliance strategy.”).
157. Id.
158. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016).
159. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 4–5.
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employee access requests and creating policies and procedures governing the
modification of access rights.160 These recommendations indicate that
entities should catalog the data they hold, consider the categories of data in
terms of risk, implement safeguards based on those considerations, and limit
and monitor access to the data.
Finally, it is significant to note that the SEC requires a written policy that
is reasonably tailored. This requires “more than a generic, cookie-cutter
cybersecurity policy.”161 To formulate such a policy, covered entities must
meaningfully analyze the specific risks they face.162 The SEC guidance
notes that narrowly scoped and vague policies do not satisfy the reasonably
tailored requirement, nor do policies that only offer general guidance or
limited examples of safeguards.163 For a policy to be reasonably tailored, it
is crucial to identify how data and communications travel within the
organization and to prioritize data resources “based on their classification,
criticality, and business value.”164 By approaching the process in this way,
entities will be able to identify what requires protection and the appropriate
level of protection, which will lead to a reasonably tailored policy.165
The NYDFS regulations require that a covered entity assess data
governance and classification, asset inventory and device management, and
access controls and identity management.166 Covered entities must identify
what material nonpublic information they hold and where they are holding
that information, as such cataloging “is foundational for compliance with the
Cybersecurity Rules.”167
Many of the requirements under the NYDFS regulations can only be
achieved after the data the covered entity holds has been classified. For
example, covered entities must implement user access controls that limit
personnel access to personal information.168 This requires covered entities
to identify the information and systems that individual employees need
access to and to only permit the level of access that is required.169 A covered
entity will need to identify all the relevant data in order to satisfy this

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Blank et al., supra note 57.
See id.
Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 3.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY app. A, tbl.2 (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KDT3-YHRZ].
165. Id. at 8 (“Understanding the business context, the resources that support critical
functions, and the related cybersecurity risks enables an organization to focus and prioritize
its efforts.”).
166. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.03 (2017).
167. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, supra note 98.
168. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.07.
169. Joseph Vitale et al., NYDFS Proposed Cybersecurity Regulation for Financial
Services Companies, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, at 4 (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/4/v2/145023/091516-NYDFS-Proposes-Detailedand-Sweeping-Cybersecurity-Regula.pdf [http://perma.cc/8UQG-Q3X5].
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requirement.170 Similarly, the covered entities must assess all data and
systems in order to identify which will be governed by the specified measures
discussed above, such as multifactor authentication and encryption
requirements, and take steps to satisfy the requirements.171
The GDPR includes an accountability principle, which obligates covered
entities to maintain records that demonstrate their compliance with the
GDPR.172 This includes recording the purpose for which they hold data as
well as the ways they are processing it.173 The covered entity must also track
where the data is transferred, including locations outside the EU, and how
that data is handled, including how long it is retained.174 Finally, it must
document the technical and organizational measures taken to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements.175 To satisfy this obligation, the United
Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office recommends that covered
entities “document what personal data [they] hold, where it came from and
who [they] share it with” and adds that it may be necessary “to [organize] an
information audit.”176
In addition to facilitating compliance with the accountability requirements,
data classification would permit timely compliance with other obligations,
such as providing requested data to supervisory authorities.177 It would also
allow covered entities to demonstrate that their plans protect data by design
and by default, as required.178 A final benefit would be an enhanced ability
to assess the risks to the rights and freedoms of EU citizens. Since the GDPR
advocates such a risk-based approach, data classification will help an entity
determine the extent of their GDPR obligations.179

170. PWC Fin. Crimes Unit, Cyber: New York Regulator Moves the Goalposts, FIN.
CRIMES OBSERVER (Sept. 2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financialcrimes/publications/assets/NY-DFS-proposes-cybersecurity-regulations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KS3-SBQV].
171. Asner et al., supra note 96.
172. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 30; Preparing for the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): 12 Steps to Take Now, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF. 3
(2018) [hereinafter Preparing for the GDPR], https://web.archive.org/web/20180706184647/
https://ico.org.uk/media/1624219/preparing-for-the-gdpr-12-steps.pdf.
173. Hanno Timner & Alex van der Wolk, M&A and the New European Data Protection
Rules: Additional Risks for Transactions and How to Avoid Them, 20 WALL STREET LAW.,
July 2016, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Preparing for the GDPR, supra note 172, at 3.
177. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 152, at 35.
178. Id.; Teresa Troester-Falk & Paul Breitbarth, Does GDPR Article 30 Require a Data
Inventory?, NYMITY (July 2017), https://www.nymity.com/~/media/NymityAura/Resources/
Nymity%20Insights/Nymity_Insights-GDPR_Article_30_Data_Inventory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WSP-SW27] (“Logically, until an organisation truly understands what
personal data they have, where it is located, and how it moves through and out of the
organisation, it is not possible to protect it nor is it possible to fully comply with the GDPR
(at least in spirit).”).
179. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 152, at 34.
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B. Words Are Easy, Like the Wind; but Writing Is Hard
All three regulatory regimes require a documented policy, with some
differences in explicitness and the factors that must be considered. In
cybersecurity examinations, the SEC focused on “(1) governance and risk
assessment; (2) access rights and controls; (3) data loss prevention;
(4) vendor management; (5) training; and (6) incident response.”180 The
SEC’s focus on these six factors indicates that these factors influence whether
the policy is reasonably designed to protect consumer information and is
tailored to the entity’s needs. A covered entity should closely consider these
factors in formulating its written policy.
Early SEC enforcement actions provide insight into what it expects the
written policy to contain, such as technical security measures and
administrative procedures for addressing security issues.181 The SEC actions
indicate that the policies must be tailored and, therefore, specific.182 The
SEC also found a written policy insufficient because it failed to provide
guidance and training regarding data protection to personnel.183
Subsequent enforcement actions indicate more specific requirements and
note their subjects’ failure to address elements such as periodic risk
assessments, firewall use, a response plan in the event of a breach, or
measures for handling data.184 This marks a change from the early
enforcement actions, as the SEC looks beyond a failure to address known
issues or implement the most basic of security measures. These actions
suggest that the SEC will take a closer look at the policies and evaluate the
measures taken on a more technical level moving forward. A part of this
more technical analysis seems to include assessing whether the policy
reflects a real consideration of the unique infrastructure utilized by a covered
entity in deciding whether it was appropriately tailored.185 A final
development appears to be a requirement to include procedures to implement
and monitor employee access controls.186
The NYDFS regulations also require that the written policy address
physical, administrative, and technical controls.187 The written policy must
comprehensively outline all aspects of the entity’s cybersecurity program and
identify how the entity complies with each element of the regulations.188
Although more explicit and extensive than the requirements the SEC has
articulated, the NYDFS regulations include many similar elements. Specific
180. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75.
181. See generally Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220 (Apr. 7, 2011);
Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60,733, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2929 (Sept. 29, 2009).
182. See Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220, at 3 (Apr. 7, 2011).
183. Id.
184. See R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4204, at 3 (Sept. 22, 2015).
185. See Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2016).
186. See Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2–3 (June 8, 2016).
187. Chabinsky et al., supra note 99.
188. Vitale et al., supra note 169, at 3.

426

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

elements include measures addressing information security, data governance
and classification, asset inventory and device management, access controls
and identity management,189 systems and network security, systems and
network monitoring, customer data privacy, and incident response.190 The
plan must also address the cybersecurity training program.191
It is also likely that financial institutions will be required to perform a
DPIA under the GDPR.192 This assessment must include a list of the actions
the entity will take and the tools they will employ to protect their data.193
Even absent a DPIA, the GDPR requires a policy that includes “appropriate
technical and organisational measures.”194 This means that the policies must
address security risks as they affect the “confidentiality, integrity, availability
and resilience” of systems, the entity’s ability to maintain “availability and
access to personal data,” and the “testing, assessing and evaluating” of
measures in place.195 These measures should be based on the available
technology as well as context, costs, and risks.196
The WP29 also indicates that measures should be in place to manage the
network through traffic analysis.197 It identifies the development of
capabilities aimed at preventing a breach when possible, and reacting in a
timely manner when not, as key to a data security policy.198 Finally, it
identifies the detection, remediation, and timely reporting of a breach as
essential elements of a security policy.199
C. 5 14 3 18 25 16 20 9 15 14
Encryption is the “process of changing plaintext into ciphertext for the
purpose of security or privacy.”200 Plaintext is what you are reading now,
text that has not been coded or encrypted to make it unintelligible.201
Somewhat circuitously, ciphertext is text that has been encrypted or rendered
unintelligible through the use of a cipher.202 Plaintext is transformed into

189. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.14 (2017) (including specific “policies,
procedures and controls designed to monitor the activity of Authorized Users and detect
unauthorized access or use of, or tampering with, Nonpublic Information by such Authorized
Users”).
190. Id. § 500.03.
191. Id. § 500.14.
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 35.
194. Id. art. 32.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 135, at 10.
198. Id. at 6.
199. Id. at 11.
200. ELAINE BARKER, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION
800-175B, GUIDELINE FOR USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC STANDARDS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS 5 (2016), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-175B.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3WB-Q3L5].
201. Id. at 7.
202. Id. at 4.
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ciphertext through the use of cryptographic methods.203 These methods rely
on the use of an algorithm204 and a key.205 These components are used in
conjunction to encrypt and decrypt the data.206 Since the algorithm is usually
publicly available, the secrecy of the key is what provides the security
benefits derived from the use of cryptography.207 Two common types of
cryptographic algorithms that permit relatively rapid data movement are
cryptographic hash functions208 and symmetric-key algorithms.209
Cryptographic algorithms have a finite lifetime, as they can be attacked
and compromised over time, which prevents the algorithm from providing
the desired level of protection.210 This lifetime is often linked to the
algorithm strength, which is measured by the difficulty of breaking the
algorithm.211 Algorithm strength can generally be increased by lengthening
the key.212 It is also critically important to adopt adequate safeguards for
selecting and handling the keys themselves.213
The SEC has not created any rule-based requirement regarding the use of
encryption.214 Rather, it has suggested the need for encryption through

203. Id. at 1 (“Cryptography is a branch of mathematics that is based on the transformation
of data and can be used to provide several security services . . . .”).
204. Id. at 4 (defining cryptographic algorithm as “[a] well-defined computational
procedure that takes variable inputs, including a cryptographic key (if applicable), and
produces an output”).
205. Id. (defining cryptographic key as “[a] parameter used in conjunction with a
cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without
knowledge of the key cannot”).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 19 (“A hash function (also called a hash algorithm) is a cryptographic primitive
algorithm that produces a condensed representation of its input (e.g., a message). A hash
function takes an input of arbitrary length and outputs a value with a predetermined length.”).
209. Id. at 20 (“Symmetric-key algorithms (sometimes called secret-key algorithms) use a
single key to both apply cryptographic protection and to remove or check the protection. For
example, the key used to encrypt data (i.e., apply protection) is also used to decrypt the
encrypted data (i.e., remove the protection) . . . .”).
210. Id. at 27 (“The attack could be on the algorithm itself, or could be on the algorithm
with a specific key length. In the latter case, the use of a longer key may prevent a successful
attack, or at least delay it for a period of time.”).
211. Id. at 26 (“Breaking a cryptographic algorithm can be defined as defeating some aspect
of the protection that the algorithm is intended to provide. For example, a block cipher
encryption algorithm that is used to protect the confidentiality of data is broken if, with an
acceptable amount of work, it is possible to determine the value of its key or to recover the
plaintext from the ciphertext without knowledge of the key.”).
212. Id. at 27 (“The approved security strengths for federal applications are 112, 128, 192
and 256 bits. Note that a security strength of 80 bits was previously approved as well.”
(emphasis omitted)).
213. Id. at 37 (“[T]he security of information protected by cryptography directly depends
on the strength of the keys, the effectiveness of mechanisms and protocols associated with
keys, and the protection afforded to the keys themselves.”).
214. NEXT Fin. Grp., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 349, at 40 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
ALJ June 18, 2008) (“The SEC neither established minimum standards nor discussed
encryption when it proposed and adopted Regulation S-P.”).
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enforcement actions215 and guidance.216 The SEC noted in its action against
R.T. Jones that a failure to encrypt client PII was problematic.217 While
enumerating positive changes made by R.T. Jones, the SEC specifically
mentioned that the company began encrypting client PII.218 In the CSC
enforcement action, the SEC also discussed the failure to use encryption.219
The attention to encryption in two of its most recent enforcement actions
likely indicates that the SEC views encryption as an important measure to
consider.
The SEC guidance also focused on encryption and described it as a
potential part of a robust security policy.220 The encryption recommendation
is significant since it indicates that the SEC expects a network to be
adequately designed to limit the damage caused by an intrusion. The
encryption recommendation indicates that the SEC recognizes this as a useful
tool in mitigating damage and in rendering information on a network
inaccessible in the event of a breach.
The NYDFS regulations require that data both in transit and at rest be
encrypted unless the entity’s chief information security officer finds that it is
infeasible.221 While requiring that data “in transit over external networks and
at rest” be encrypted, the NYDFS offers little guidance regarding how it
should be implemented beyond that it must be based on a risk assessment.222
Notably missing is guidance—like that issued by New York State to state
agencies—regarding acceptable forms of encryption, including minimum bit
strength and minimum key length.223
The GDPR recommends encryption as a possible measure for entities to
adopt.224 It also permits covered entities to avoid breach disclosure if the
information breached is not intelligible due to appropriate technical

215. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 5–6 (Apr. 12, 2016);
R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, at 3
(Sept. 22, 2015).
216. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 5.
217. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204,
at 3 (Sept. 22, 2015).
218. Id.
219. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 6 (Apr. 12, 2016).
220. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 5.
221. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.15 (2017).
222. Id.
223. NYS OFFICE OF INFO. TECH. SERVS., NO: NYS-S14-007, IT STANDARD: ENCRYPTION
(July 11, 2017), https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-s14-007_encryption_
standard_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UPB-3CPL] (“Encryption products for confidentiality of
data at rest and data in transit must incorporate Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) approved algorithms for data encryption at a minimum of 128 bit strength. Minimum
key length for digital signatures and public key encryption is 2048. Hashing functions must
have a minimum key length of 256.”).
224. GDPR Preparedness: An Indicator of Cyber Risk Management, MARSH &
MCLENNAN COMPANIES, at 6 (Oct. 2017), https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/
Documents/PDF/US-en/Cyber-Survey-Report-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9MK-JXCF]
(“Of the information security activities we asked about, only one—encrypting organizational
computers—is explicitly encouraged by GDPR.”).
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measures, including encryption.225 The WP29 endorses the use of a “state of
the art algorithm.”226 It also states that the data should be properly
encrypted.227 The WP29 suggests that determining the proper encryption
method requires an in-depth analysis of the risks the entity faces and the
quality of the encryption method, including the level of protection it provides
and the steps necessary to properly implement it.228
III. THE BENEFITS OF COORDINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN
CYBERSECURITY REGULATION
Part III proceeds in two parts. Part III.A discusses why collaboration is
generally desirable and presents a few examples of mechanisms that could
be used to effectuate international and domestic regulatory compromise. Part
III.B explores how these mechanisms could be applied to further clarify the
requirements for data classification, written policies, and encryption, and the
specific benefits of such mechanisms.
A. The Why and How of Coordinating Cybersecurity Regulations
Cooperation between the regulatory bodies “will inevitably yield better,
and more consistent, policy formation and guidance on both sides of the
Atlantic.”229 This result will follow in part from the development of a
common lexicon which can be leveraged in assessing the policies developed
by covered entities.230 Formalizing collaboration would support better
policy by adding structure and sustainability to the process. This would
promote shared learning as all three bodies apply cybersecurity principles in
Such an arrangement could “improve
new contexts.231
communication/collective thinking and avoid missed opportunities to
Further, collaboration
develop and coordinate . . . new policies.”232
contributes to identifying and promoting baseline protections within the
financial sector.233 Cooperation in this area could contribute to improved
cybersecurity and resiliency for the entire financial infrastructure.234
Collaboration will create benefits by limiting the degree of divergence
between legal regimes.235 Failing to align the requirements where possible
results in unnecessary additional work streams that achieve compliance, but
225. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 34.
226. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 135, at 15.
227. Id. at 16.
228. Id.
229. See PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 23.
230. See 2017 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ANN. REP. 7.
231. See PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 39.
232. Id. at 40.
233. 2017 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ANN. REP. 8–9, 130.
234. Grp. of 7 [G7], Fundamental Elements of Cybersecurity for the Financial Sector
(2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/G7%20
Fundamental%20Elements%20Oct%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/844L-2W42].
235. PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 23 (“To the extent that collaboration encourages
consistency in guidance across the Atlantic, regulated parties can avoid the costs of having to
comply with divergent legal regimes.”).
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little else.236 Collaborating would minimize these unnecessary work streams
and curb the additional compliance costs for companies operating in all three
jurisdictions.237 This would be especially beneficial for smaller entities that
are already struggling with thinner margins, and it would potentially allow
them to remain independent.238 While it may seem like collaboration would
only reduce these costs incrementally, it is important to remember the
magnitude of foreign investment between the United States and the EU,
which totaled $4.2 trillion in 2014.239 The large amount of investment and
close economic relationship between the United States and the EU would
magnify even incremental cost reductions.
Despite differences in the way data protection is approached in the United
States and the EU,240 similarities in values and goals “provide[] common
ground on which to build practical solutions.”241 The SEC, NYDFS, and EU
all engage in various forms of international cooperation in the interest of
furthering their regulatory goals.242 A number of collaborative tools could
be utilized by the three bodies to harmonize their regulatory schemes in areas
where common goals are shared.243 These include dialogues,244 memoranda

236.
237.
238.
239.

See SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 4.
See European Commission Memorandum MEMO/06/477, supra note 24, at 2, 7–8.
See generally supra Part I.B.
EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO THE U.S., THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR
AMERICANS 16 (Sept. 20, 2014), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/guide-for-americans_
euintheus.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML87-VF29].
240. PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 23 (“Of course, each entity must remain free to
reach whatever conclusions it believes are warranted under applicable EU and US law,
respectively.”).
241. See id. at 20 (“The possibility of . . . bridges derives from the common heritage of the
EU and the US, the history of dialogue between them, and the common challenges they face.
Despite their differences, the EU and US are both liberal democracies with a high degree of
respect for the rule of law.”).
242. See generally Letter from Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, Chairwoman, Article 29 Working
Party, to David Wright, Sec’y Gen., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2015/20150924__
letter_of_the_art_29_wp_iosco.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GHW-KLFB]; Press Release No.
2013-131, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, European Regulators Establish Supervisory Cooperation
Arrangements Related to the Asset Management Industry (July 19, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-131 [https://perma.cc/3PBD-UY7K]; N.Y.
Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Interagency Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding and Other
Information-Sharing
Agreements,
N.Y.
ST.,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/
interagency_agree_mou.htm [http://perma.cc/TV3A-29HR] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
243. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Remarks at the International
Bar Association Annual Conference Legal Practice Division Luncheon: Securities Regulation
in the Interconnected, Global Marketplace (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/securities-regulation-in-the-interconnected-global-marketplace.html
[http://perma.cc/YLJ6-5RQ7] (“Neither the SEC, nor other regulators, can go it alone, and we
have many avenues to facilitate working together.”).
244. SEC Dialogues with Foreign Regulatory Authorities, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateraldialogs.shtml
[http://perma.cc/J2XMFS7B] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see also PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 38
(“[P]ropos[ing] that . . . European and US executive agencies and decision-making bodies
engage in active dialogue and, where appropriate, effective coordination of their regulatory
activity.”).
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of understanding,245 nonbinding policy agreements,246 and endorsing
nonbinding technical standards.247
B. Applying the Benefits and Mechanisms to Requirements
This Part focuses on the benefits particular to the common requirements
specified in Part II. It also explores how collaborative tools could be used to
harmonize these areas. The purpose is to show how collaboration could
operate, and the concrete benefits that such collaboration would create.
1. Breaking Down Data-Classification Barriers
Data classification is a critical first step underlying many of the
requirements or expectations enunciated by all three bodies.248 Performing
that step provides a better understanding of what risks companies face based
on their industry and infrastructure.249 However, performing such an
inventory can be complicated, complex, and resource intensive.250 Given the
need to perform some type of data-classification analysis to comply with all
three regulatory regimes and the inevitable expense of doing so, cooperation
between the three bodies to provide additional guidance in this area would
be valuable.
In the United States, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the “NIST
Framework”) is a useful tool that provides guidance on how this step could
be carried out. The NIST Framework recommends the performance of core
functions, one of which is to “Identify.”251 This function requires the
identification of a number of factors that are divided into categories that are
relevant to assessing an organization’s posture and risks.252 Two

245. PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 5 (proposing that ties should be strengthened
through “institutionaliz[ing] the working relationship between the Article 29 WP and the
FTC” via a memorandum of understanding, and that this recommendation could be modified
to apply to the SEC, NYDFS, and WP29).
246. Christopher Kuner, An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues
and Prospects, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 307, 307–17 (2009) (“Various groups have
issued policy documents containing voluntary data protection principles that are designed to
be used on a global basis.”).
247. Id. at 20 (“Several groups have already created technical standards for data protection
and privacy which are not legally binding, but which can be adopted by States and
organizations on a voluntary basis.”).
248. See generally supra Part II.
249. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 164; Troester-Falk & Breitbarth,
supra note 178 (“Privacy officers are often taught that the first step in establishing a privacy
program is to create a personal data inventory as way of prioritizing efforts, resources,
assessing risks, and preparing for privacy incidents and breaches.”).
250. Troester-Falk & Breitbarth, supra note 178 (proposing an interesting alternative to a
traditional data inventory in the form of a data-processing inventory focused on the details of
the processing activity).
251. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 164, at 4.
252. Id. app. A, tbl.2 (“Asset Management; Business Environment; Governance; Risk
Assessment; and Risk Management Strategy.”).
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subcategories are relevant to performing a data classification.253 The first is
mapping the organization and data flows and the second is prioritizing
resources, including data, based on their “classification, criticality, and
business value.”254 The NIST Framework does not mandate a specific
methodology for carrying this task out and instead provides informative
references.255 These references are from a variety of organizations that offer
detailed recommendations for how to carry out these tasks.
Since the NIST Framework already exists and financial institutions have
already “designed their cybersecurity programs to implement the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework,”256 it would facilitate cohesion and mitigate
duplicative efforts if data classification recommendations were based in part
on the existing practices recommended by the NIST Framework. The three
bodies could simply evaluate the recommendations made by the
organizations the NIST Framework includes as informative references.
Through dialogues, the three bodies could agree on which recommendations
best accomplish common goals and publish a common list for use by the
covered entities. Additional recommendations from other organizations
could be included if agreed upon, but it would be ideal if some of the NIST
Framework recommendations were included since they have already been
widely implemented. It would also be helpful if explanations were provided
regarding why certain recommendations were selected, as it could provide
insight that would allow covered entities to adopt them in a more targeted
manner. These would likely have to take the form of nonbinding policy
guidance. However, agreement in this area would provide valuable guidance
to covered entities regarding a critically important step that can potentially
be very costly.
2. Writing the Playbook
The separate written policy requirements should be streamlined through
consensus among the three bodies in order to create a single cohesive process
and resultant document. Covered entities often have difficulty harmonizing
the various requirements created by different regulatory regimes.257 The
complexity of the different requirements creates unnecessary financial costs
in the form of time and resources spent on repetitive actions.258 An approach
that combines as many of the common steps and requirements as possible

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 2.
257. What Is Regulatory Compliance?, THRIVE NETWORKS (Oct. 27, 2011),
https://www.thrivenetworks.com/blog/regulatory-compliance/
[http://perma.cc/Y4NM2XPW] (“[M]any companies face multiple policies and regulations with regard to IT and data
storage. This presents a challenge for most businesses . . . .”).
258. The Challenges of Managing and Tracking Compliance with Multiple Standards,
SYSNET GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, https://sysnetgs.com/2017/04/challenges-managing-trackingcompliance-multiple-standards/ [http://perma.cc/WQN3-KATQ] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
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reduces these costs, saves time, and limits duplicative efforts.259 Private
sector companies offer products that are marketed as solutions to this
problem; however, these products can be costly, especially for smaller
entities.260 And independently performing the analysis to create such a
process also requires time and effort, which translates to financial costs.261
All three regulatory regimes require a written policy.262 The elements they
have identified as relevant to an acceptable written policy are largely similar
and include such things as technical measures, monitoring mechanisms,
access controls, training programs, and incident response plans.263 The three
bodies could maintain flexibility while still providing valuable guidance in
the form of unofficial guidelines for creating a written policy. This could be
relatively general and simply identify all of the elements that they would like
the entity to consider in formulating the policy and identifying which
regulation or regulations that element pertains to. This would help the
covered entities adequately consider each element, identify which regulation
requires it, and determine whether they are compliant.
Currently, the guidance in this area is either lacking or so general it
essentially quotes from the regulation.264 It would be beneficial if the three
bodies produced a document similar to the Security Series promulgated by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.265 In those documents,
the relevant requirements are broken down into elements and questions for
the covered entities to consider in formulating their policies and
procedures.266 They also identify what is required and what is optional.267
Alternatively, some private sector organizations provide free templates
outlining factors to consider in formulating different elements of a security
policy.268 Either of these types of document would be valuable to covered
entities pursuing compliance.
The three bodies could engage in dialogues aimed at drafting such a
document, or series of documents, and publish nonbinding guidelines
according to their relevant statutes and authorities. This is desirable because
the entities are best situated to identify and explain what they expect. Further,
the discussions that would be necessary to create such a document would
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See General Data Protection Regulation: Guide for Processors, COMMISSION
NATIONALE INFORMATIQUE & LIBERTÉS, at 17 (2017), https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/rgpd-guide_sous-traitant-cnil_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DG5-XB96].
265. See generally Security Standards: Administrative Safeguards, 2 HIPAA SECURITY
SERIES (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), Mar. 2007, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/adminsafeguards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YM5V-E5K9].
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See generally Router and Switch Security Policy, SANS INST. (2014),
https://www.sans.org/security-resources/policies/network-security/pdf/router-and-switchsecurity-policy [https://perma.cc/RYY7-BPXV].
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help develop and share best practices and improve overall understanding of
threats.269 Finally, providing such a document would provide a more
manageable and affordable path to compliance for all entities—particularly
smaller ones that cannot afford to purchase private sector products that
perform this analysis or perform it independently. Given the magnitude of
the economic relationships, and the significance of financial institutions
within those relationships, the impact of such a collaborative product would
be far-reaching and should result in substantial economic benefits.
3. Decrypting Encryption
Encryption is another area where collaborative guidance could be
beneficial. It is unclear precisely how encryption should be implemented to
satisfy each set of regulations. A number of benefits would follow if
common standards for encryption were established or endorsed by the
regulatory bodies.270 For example, standards would allow covered entities
to shop for the most cost-effective product for their specific needs.271
Standards also homogenize the level of security, so that individuals can
implement approved cryptographic algorithms and key lengths and know the
encryption is adequate.272 In addition, standards contribute to the quality of
products, by, for example specifying how features are implemented and
requiring maintenance procedures to test whether the product continues to
function correctly.273 Finally, standards create common specifications that
can also help limit knowledge and compatibility costs.274
The three bodies could approach this issue by engaging in a joint dialogue
to identify the minimum standards they believe are necessary. Areas that
could be addressed include algorithm strength, key length, and best practices
for key management. As discussed above, algorithm strength can weaken
over time,275 which is why such dialogues should be ongoing. That way, any
products of such dialogues can be updated or modified as circumstances
require. Consensus guidance could be promulgated by each body using an
appropriate vehicle according to the requirements and limitations of their
statutory authority, keeping in mind that encryption is subject to change.
269. Jan Neutze, Positive Steps on the Road Towards Harmonization of Global
Cybersecurity Risk Management Frameworks, MICROSOFT SECURE (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2014/12/19/nis-platform/
[https://perma.cc/5H8N-HFJE].
270. BARKER, supra note 200, at 12 (“Standards define common practices, methods, and
measures/metrics. Standards provide solutions that have been evaluated by experts in relevant
areas, reviewed by the public and subsequently accepted by a wide community of users. By
using standards, organizations can reduce costs and protect their investments in technology.”).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 13 (“Without standards, users may be required to become experts in every
information technology (IT) product that is being considered for procurement. Also, without
standards, products may not interoperate with different products purchased by other users.
This could result in a significant waste of money or in the delay of implementing IT.”).
275. See generally supra Part II.
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As an alternative to defining standards themselves and revisiting them
periodically, the bodies could identify organizations that promulgate
encryption standards that meet their agreed criteria. Such criteria could
include how often the standards organizations update their policies, what
level of security the standards they recommend provide, and how widely
those standards have been deployed. The three bodies could identify specific
encryption standards based on similar criteria if they preferred. An additional
benefit of this method is that there are organizations that certify the
implementation of many of these standards. If the three bodies endorsed or
certified these standards and organizations, covered entities would be able to
more easily demonstrate an adequate implementation of encryption. It would
also allow the regulatory bodies to more easily identify covered entities that
meet their minimum standards.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there is no way to prevent all intrusions and cyber incidents
from occurring. Therefore, the question is how resources should be allocated
in a reasonable way to limit risk, mitigate damage, and protect consumers.
Regulations are based on the judgments each regulatory body has made about
the costs and benefits of sometimes competing values, reflecting the
preferences of their constituencies. There will remain numerous areas where
the regulations cannot be easily harmonized. But by identifying and working
toward a consensus in the areas that can be harmonized, it is possible to
shrink the areas of difference.
Doing as much as possible to weave the patchwork of regulations that
currently exists into a cohesive set of practices would benefit every
stakeholder. With reasonably consistent and clear paths to compliance,
covered entities will be able to focus on implementing best practices, instead
of identifying requirements. This will both lower the cost and improve the
implementation of the practices established by the SEC, NYDFS, and EU.
Consumers would be able to enjoy the protection contemplated by the
regulations at the lowest cost. These three regulatory bodies can collaborate,
using their expertise and resources to provide this guidance. This would
more effectively mitigate the negative effects of cyber incidents, protect both
the industries and consumers they oversee, and further the policies that they
are statutorily charged with implementing.

